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# STRATEGY RESEARCH **PROJECT**

**CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS ARE THEY VIABLE MISSIONS FOR THE ARMY RESERVE?** 

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JON H. ROBINETT **United States Army** 

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# CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS ARE THEY VIABLE MISSIONS FOR THE ARMY RESERVE?

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Lieutenant Colonel Jon H. Robinett United States Army

> COL Robert H. Wig Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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#### **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Jon H. Robinett (LTC), USA

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The demise of the Soviet Union has drastically changed the international security environment for the United States. Threats to our national security continue but are far more uncertain. Since the Soviet Union's demise, the United States's military has undergone a gradual drawdown. When coupled with seemingly unending requirements to participate in contingency operations, it would seem appropriate that the nation begin to examine better methods of employing its Reserve Forces. First, however, decisions must be made as to when, how and if Reserve Forces will be utilized. Currently, they are beginning to gain more roles in the area of contingency operations. Are Reservists prepared to participate in these operations? Do contingency operations prepare them for other missions which may require even greater skills? Are there any benefits to Reserve participation? This study explores the growth of Reserve Forces and their ability to operate within the contingency operation environment. It argues that contingency operations are suited to Reserve Forces and, that given the opportunity to do so, they perform missions equally as well as their Active Duty counterparts.

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#### **INTRODUCTION**

Since its inception, military and civilian leaders alike have wrestled with the questions of how, when and if Reserve Component forces should be utilized. Additionally, there has been great concern over the steps necessary to prepare Reservists for mobilization. Given the recent drawdown of Active Duty forces, these questions become even more critical to the United States' ability to meet its national security goals.

To gain a better understanding of the vital role of the Reserve Forces to our national defense, the following must be examined: the historical use of Reserve Forces, problems arising with preparedness and mobilization in Desert Shield/Storm and the dependency of the Active Component on Reserve Forces.

One critical role Reservists can play is in supporting the Active Component in performing contingency operations. Army Reservists, as units and individuals, currently participate in a variety of contingency operations to include peace operations, humanitarian relief, disaster relief and actions to quell civil disturbances. Do these missions properly prepare Reservists for international deployment? Are Reservists prepared to perform their assigned missions? Are there benefits which can be derived from their participation? This paper will attempt to answer these questions.

#### **HISTORY**

Known initially as the organized militia, Reserve Forces have supported the Active Components in virtually every war since our nation's inception. Its first recorded use was during the Revolutionary War when the organized militia provided George Washington the means to defeat a larger, better trained and equipped British Force. It met its first foreign challenge during the War of 1812 and provided individual volunteers for the Civil War. As time progressed, senior military leaders began to view these forces as part-time soldiers who were incompetent in military matters. This attitude so permeated the nation that although the Reserve Forces provided a 125,00 man force for the Spanish-American War, combat actions were conducted primarily by the Active Component.

In 1903 the militia was divided into two categories: the National Guard and the Reserve Militia, now known as the Army Reserve. This division enabled the National Guard, only, to receive federal inspection of units, pay for maneuvers, access to equipment and supplies, and eligibility to attend Regular Army schools. Failure to provide these benefits to the Reserves contributed to their unpreparedness in future years.<sup>5</sup>

Editorial Comment: Readers should note that preceding paragraphs referred to the Reserve Forces or Militia as one in the same. However, with the formal separation of these forces in 1903, they began to develop along distinctively separate paths. Therefore, future references to the Reserves or Reserve Forces will be addressing solely the Army Reserve.

The purpose of the newly created Reserve Militia was to reinforce the Regular Army in time of war.<sup>6</sup> A given necessity since it had been determined that the National Guard could

pursue an invading force outside the United States boundary but, in general, could not be employed outside the United States.<sup>7</sup> The first mobilization of this newly created force came on June 28, 1916, in response to Poncho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico.<sup>8</sup>

By the time the United States entered World War I, the reserves had begun to gain increased interest from Congress. So much so that Congress created a separate Enlisted Reserve Corps for service with the Regular Army in the Engineer, Signal, Quartermaster, Ordnance and Medical Fields.<sup>9</sup> All total, the reserves provided over 186,000 soldiers to the war effort. <sup>10</sup>

Although Reservists had shown their willingness to support the war, they continued to be plagued by the Army's inattention. In particular, most Reservists were typically undertrained, most often receiving less than two weeks of training every four or five years. <sup>11</sup> Additionally, the Army refused to allow them to receive inactive duty training pay for their scheduled training periods, <sup>12</sup> and offered formal training only through correspondence courses. <sup>13</sup> Reservists were also faced with inadequate or nonexistent equipment, training facilities and supplies.

Over the next five decades, the reserves would continually respond to the nation's call.

Although they willingly provided personnel for each conflict, they continued to suffer from the problems previously mentioned. It was not until 1970 that their program was to begin a meteoric rise to its present capability.

In response to President Nixon's ending the draft and subsequent creation of an all-volunteer force, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced the creation of the Total Force Policy. <sup>14</sup> In essence, this new policy mandated that the Reserve Components would be the initial and primary source of additional units and individuals in any future rapid deployment. <sup>15</sup> To make the policy work, substantial, immediate changes would have to be made to the reserve

program.

One of the first actions taken was to increase the numbers of Reservists on Active Duty working directly towards the improvement of unit readiness. Filling positions such as recruiters, plans and operations managers, mobilization planners and service school instructors, these reservists began to make substantial improvements in unit preparedness. <sup>16</sup> Still, it was not until the 1980s that the Reserves became fully integrated into the Army's mobilization packages. <sup>17</sup>

Mobilization exercises such as Nifty Nugget and Proud Spirit helped to identify and correct preparedness shortfalls. Reservists began to participate in overseas deployment training (ODT) exercises in areas such as Europe, Central America, the Pacific, North Africa and Southwest Asia. These programs and numerous others helped to shape the Reserves into a force that was mission capable and deployable. It had become a strategic force but was not yet proven in a war time scenario. That test would come in the Persian Gulf.

#### THE FIRST BIG TEST

On August 22, 1990, President Bush executed his authority for a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up of 200,000 Reservists. An action taken in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it represented the largest mobilization in over thirty years. The Army Reserve provided 50% of the Total Army Reserve Component and over 35% of the Department of Defense's Reserve Component(includes reserves from all services). For the first time since the creation of the Total Force Policy, Reservists were thrust into a major contingency operation that required they take full advantage of every facet of unit training.

Their missions included: petroleum handling and distribution, water distribution, transportation, movement control, port operations, psychological operations and civil affairs activities. Reservists played a critical role in the planning and managing of soldiers arriving in theater and in sustaining the force. In addition to the forces supplied directly to Southwest Asia, Reservists also back-filled Active Duty units deploying from Europe and the United States. Their involvement in the conflict covered a wide spectrum of responsibilities and helped to solidify their position as a part of the Total Army. Although heralded as one of our nations greatest military accomplishments, the operation was not without problems for the Army Reserve. Problems which must be addressed if the Reserves are to continue to be active participants in contingency operations.

Although not all inclusive, some of the more critical problems will be discussed beginning with the Army Mobilization and Operation Planning Systems (AMOPS). AMOPS was designed for a Partial Mobilization of one million soldiers. When implemented, it would activate the necessary infrastructure to ensure that the Base Operations (BASOPS) of installations designed as Mobilization Stations (MOBSTAs), were prepared to receive the sudden influx of Reservists. Initially, Desert Shield/Storm represented a Presidential Call-Up of only 200,000. MOBSTAs, therefore, found themselves ill prepared to meet the sudden influx of personnel since the appropriate support units had not been mobilized.

Numerous personnel problems were created as enumerated herein. Stop-loss procedures were not implemented equally between the Active and Reserve Component forces creating the potential for Reservists to leave the service prior to the conflict terminating. Many units failed to complete a proper and thorough records screening prior to activation resulting in individuals

being called to active duty who did not meet accessioning standards. Since there were no standard procedures for outprocessing non-deployable soldiers, many of them were retained on active duty to assist the MOBSTAs who were short of support personnel.

Additionally, numerous Reserve units failed to consistently follow orders preparation formats which resulted in lost or delayed benefits for service members and their families.

Commanders had not ensured that single parent or dual service couples had validated their Family Care Plans. The result being that their deployment was delayed or that their dependent's care was not properly programmed.

Also, many Reservists did not understand the benefits of the Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Acts (SSCRA) nor the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). As a result, some dependents failed to receive their authorized medical care and/or were faced with delinquent debts due to the soldier's being called to active duty.

Some MOBSTAs deviated from the published formats of the Forces Command

Mobilization and Deployment Planning Systems (FORMDEPS), thereby requiring units to

duplicate administrative procedures that had already been completed at home station. It was not

uncommon for MOBSTAs to deny unit training records, especially in weapons qualification,

even when they indicated that training had been conducted to standard. Many units had to waste

valuable training time requalifying in areas in which they were already proficient. One positive

aspect of the mobilization was recognizing that units who had completed a Mobilization and

Deployment Readiness Exercise (MODRE), at home station prior to mobilization, were better

prepared, especially in the areas of personnel, logistics and training.<sup>22</sup>

Although Desert Shield/Storm was the first major mobilization of Reserve Units, the

problems experienced were not all that new. Throughout its history, the Reserves have been fraught with problems adversely affecting mobilization preparedness. Inadequate or nonexistent facilities, equipment, and funds were the norm following World War II.<sup>23</sup> Employees have long been hesitant to hire Reservists fearing that they may be called away at a moment's notice.<sup>24</sup> Reserve units were not fully integrated into all aspects of Army mobilization planning until the late 1970s and early 1980s.<sup>25</sup> Fortunately, units and individuals alike have been able to work through these problems enabling required mobilizations to occur. The unfortunate aspect is the untold burden placed upon the system, units, individuals and family members when procedures are not properly planned or followed.

By the time Desert Shield/Storm occurred, few opportunities, short of annual training and the occasional mobilization exercise, existed for units to properly test their mobilization readiness. Although Reservists had participated in every major conflict, both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, they most often served as individual volunteers or were mobilized as individuals.

The Army's earlier failure to mobilize units, coupled with the failure to follow prescribed mobilization doctrine contributed greatly to the problems encountered during Desert

Shield/Storm. Training, logistical and administrative procedures necessary to mobilization were in place and, to one extent or another, being followed. When the time came to exercise these procedures, they were ignored or adjusted at the whim of some of the MOBSTAs Commanders, thereby negating years of preparatory work. Had these programs/plans been practiced more frequently, the MOBSTAs Commanders would have had more confidence in them. The question is not if mobilization procedures should be practiced, but how often?

Secretary of Defense William Perry and Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr., have indicated the need to incorporate Reservists into contingency operations. Their positions will be explained further in subsequent paragraphs. However, Secretary Perry has also stated that "it takes time to develop and sustain ready forces. Readiness is cumulative over time; it takes 20 years to develop individual military leaders, 1 to 7 years to develop and field technologically superior equipment, and one to two years of sustainment training to get units to their required readiness levels." He further states that "the Army has instituted over 200 separate initiatives to improve the readiness of its Active and Reserve Components to ensure they remain capable of force projection." These statements would seem to support that Reservists be given greater opportunity and frequency to practice their skills in an appropriate operational environment as current participation levels are minimal. Perhaps the answer lies in a more defined and planned operations would provide the opportunity to correct systemic deficiencies noted during the Desert Shield/ Storm mobilization.

#### **CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS - HOW DEPENDENT IS THE ACTIVE FORCE?**

The collapse of the Soviet Union and declining budgets have forced our nation to transcend from a large Cold War force to one which is far more streamlined. In fact, the Army has been engulfed in a continual draw down of forces from 770,000 in 1989 to 495,000 at the beginning of Fiscal Year 1996.<sup>28</sup> This process has also included a transfer of forces between the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to realign their respective roles and missions and has

resulted in a reorganization of the Army Reserve's command and control structure. The net result has been to strengthen the capacity of the Army Reserve to provide Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) forces for operational purposes. All total, the Reserve Components, Army Reserve and Army National Guard, comprise 51% of the total force structure which includes 58% of the CS and 70% of the CSS forces.<sup>29</sup> The Army Reserve provides a decided edge over Active Component forces in the areas of Civil Affairs (97%), Transportation (55%), Hospitals (59%) and Railroads (100%).<sup>30</sup>

This force mix becomes even more important when one considers the following statements by Secretary of Defense William Perry and Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr. According to Secretary West, "at the start of a contingency mission, active units will form the bulk of a force, while high priority Guard and Reserve units will provide capabilities not found in the active force." Also discussing contingency operations, Secretary Perry has stated that "the forces for these operations will be provided largely by the same general purpose and special operations forces needed for the MRCs [Major Regional Contingencies]. This means that the United States will not be able to conduct sizeable contingency operations at the same time it is fighting in two MRCS." As a result, the Reserve Components must be called upon to provide the Active Components a higher degree of flexibility. Currently, Active Component units provide the predominant force requirements for Contingency Operations. Greater Reserve involvement could produce a win-win scenario for both components. The operational tempo for the Active units would be somewhat reduced and the Reserve units would have a greater opportunity to become involved.

Over the past ten years, the United States government has conducted more than 70 major

contingency operations. These missions include a variety of tasks: medical services, transportation, maintenance of public order, coordination with government and private organizations and reconstitution of public facilities.<sup>33</sup> As such, they represent excellent combat support and combat service support missions. Especially given that the functions performed are little different from those conducted during war fighting missions.

When one examines the combined statements of Secretaries Perry and West, the increased frequency of contingency operations, and considers the current composition of the Reserve Component forces, it is not difficult to surmise that the Active Component has become extremely dependent upon the Reserve CS and CSS capabilities.. At a minimum, this capability is paramount to any sustained activity.

### **CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS - ARE RESERVISTS CAPABLE?**

Contingency Operations include a myriad of functions designed to promote national interests throughout the world. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, classifies these operations as: Noncombatant Evacuation, Arms Control, Support to Civil Authorities, Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, Security Assistance, Nation Assistance, Support to Counterdrug Operations, Combatting Terrorism, Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Show of Force and Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies.<sup>34</sup>

By their very nature, they provide excellent opportunities for Reservists to practice the skills necessary to maintain and improve their combat effectiveness and mobilization readiness.

Combat Support and Combat Service Support functions, the predominant Reserve force

packages, are integral parts of these activities, especially in the areas of transportation, security, supply and services, medical, civil affairs and psychological operations.

Reservists, both as individuals and units, have already established a history of participation by mobilizing for a variety of Contingency Operations throughout the past 10-15 years. They helped to restore democracy in Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy) by providing military police, medical, civil affairs, movement control and port security forces. They assisted in the humanitarian relief effort in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) by providing postal and civil affairs units. Reservists worked as part of a multinational force in Operation Provide Promise preparing emergency relief packages of food and medial supplies for Bosnia. They participated in the U.S. European Command's Military Contact Program by filling key positions with Military Liaison Teams in Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland and other former Soviet Block countries. Reservists also served as members of Traveling Contact Teams providing expertise in medicine, engineering, reserve force structure and civil affairs. Even the Drug Enforcement Agency has benefited, both in the U.S. and abroad, by support provided in a variety of areas.<sup>35</sup> They provided humanitarian assistance, security operations and medical support for Operation Just Cause in Panama. Furthermore, they continued to support the reestablishment of the Panamanian government after the military operation ceased by providing humanitarian, public health and law enforcement expertise in an ODT status. An interesting fact is that Reservists were chosen primarily for their civilian skills, emphasizing the nature of the citizen-soldier. 36

Operation Desert Shield/Storm has already been discussed. However, it is important to also note that at the conclusion of hostilities, Reserve Civil Affairs units were dispatched to

Kuwait to help rebuild the nation's infrastructure. Also, as most units redeployed home, numerous Reservists, especially those in the CS/CSS specialties, remained overseas. Their mission: to ensure personnel and equipment were properly returned to the United States. <sup>37</sup> These are but a few of the many programs in which Reservists have participated. Yet, they are representative of the magnitude of USAR involvement and demonstrate the degree to which they have become key participants in the overall scheme of contingency operations.

Contingency missions require an integrated Active and Reserve force capable of providing adequate responses to a multitude of scenarios. As a capability-based force, Reservists currently offer an efficient and effective force mix crucial to any operation. They have been integrated into the Total Force as active participants and provide capabilities that can be effectively used for non-traditional, non-warfighting missions. Reservists provide a cost effective means of augmenting the Active Components and have continuously demonstrated their readiness and relevance by supporting numerous contingency operations. Difficulties surrounding mobilization procedures have been overcome quickly demonstrating both their capacity and capability to mobilize on short notice. By doing so, they have greatly increased their accessibility for any mission.

The USAR's performance over the past decade has demonstrated its ability to enhance the nation's security as a capable and efficient force. It further indicates that they are fully capable of operating in the contingency environment and suggests that they could possibly be given a far greater role.

## BENEFITS OF RESERVE PARTICIPATION

The nation's national security policy to maintain peace through deterrence and to protect U.S. interests anywhere in the world requires a ready and capable Reserve Force. This readiness is achieved through experienced personnel who continue to receive training appropriate to their mobilization mission. Training overseas, especially in contingency operations, is especially effective. At a minimum, it provides the opportunity to exercise mobilization plans and contributes to readiness.

Contingency operations provide the opportunity for Reservists to conduct realistic missions which are normally at a lower risk than that of a MRC. In many cases, they also provide the Reserve unit the opportunity to operate with the same units they would be associated with in the event they were needed for a MRC. These missions increase awareness of mobilization requirements, reinforce a sense of belonging, increase units' abilities to deploy, and have a positive impact on unit training.

Contingency operations provide commanders at all levels with a measurement of a unit's ability to perform satisfactorily. This is not to infer that a unit should be sent to a contingency operation if it is not fully capable of performing its assigned missions. However, it does provide a measurement by which future training and mobilization decisions could be made. Units could be deployed to less threatening and hazardous operations giving them an opportunity to validate their operational readiness for more hazardous situations. In a sense, contingency operations could be used, at least on a selective basis, to test a unit's preparedness.

Contingency operations also provide reservists the opportunity to participate with other services and foreign militaries. This helps to improve their operability in a joint environment and increases their awareness of the special requirements created by a coalition or allied force. Furthermore, this helps to demonstrate to our allies and potential adversaries the ability and commitment of the United States to execute its forward presence strategy. Historically, the United States has hesitated to deploy its Reserve Forces. Doing so is a strong indicator, to allies and adversaries alike, that we have committed ourselves to the task at hand and have every intention of resolving it in an appropriate yet rapid manner.

Finally, as force multipliers, Reservists enhance the nation's ability to fulfill multiple regional roles. They provide a force which improves our capability to combat drug trafficking, increase nation-to-nation defense contacts and support peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations.

The problems associated with Desert Shield/Storm mobilization will not disappear unless all concerned have the opportunity to practice mobilization on a continuing basis. Overseas Deployment Training, Annual Training, and Mobilization Exercises do not provide the essential factors of suddenness and long term realism. Units have months if not years to plan for these activities and normally do not see them as anything special. They know that they will return home within two to three weeks and there will be no appreciable negative consequences if their performance is subpar. Also, they tend to pay little attention to requirements such as Vehicle Load Plans which are so vitally important when one unexpectedly mobilizes.

On the other hand, contingency operations are "unplanned" events. Units know that they will be deployed longer, and quickly realize the critical nature of their mission. It is not

uncommon for someone's life, perhaps even the Reservists himself, to rest on successful mission accomplishment. The entire nature of one's approach to deployment changes. The suddenness of these events allows all entities, unit, soldier, family, employer, MOBSTAs and others the opportunity to ensure that appropriate procedures are in effect. Once again, it is not uncommon for attitudes and procedures to change when one is faced with the "real thing."

The benefits gleaned from contingency operations cannot be overlooked. Besides those inherent with mobilization and combat preparedness, Reservists are often able to deal with contingency missions, such as Humanitarian and Disaster Relief, more as a civilian than a soldier. On the other hand, in these same types of missions, Active Duty soldiers often have difficulties relating to the civilian population.

Due in part to their constant combat training and "warrior" attitude, Active Duty soldiers find it more difficult to adjust their behaviors to those which are most necessary in these environments. The ability of Reservists to adjust quickly to local "civilian attitudes" helps to generate fewer problems with local populations as well as the numerous government and nongovernment organizations which can be expected to be present. Additionally, they feel a personal sense of accomplishment in improving their skills, they build esprit de corps within the unit and enhance recruiting capabilities when participating in these missions. 38

## **IS THERE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION?**

Economic realities mandate the United States must redefine missions for its military forces. Balancing missions between Active and Reserve Components can be a highly political

undertaking. The nation must tailor its shrinking military budget and forces to realistically attainable, affordable and worthwhile national security interests.

While the military is being downsized, its role in contingency operations is increasing. These contradicting agendas raise questions about how the military forces are being addressed: politically, operationally and economically. Is anyone actually considering the military was designed to be a national defense resource? This conflict significantly impacts on every soldier and his/her family members. While thousands of soldiers are being involuntarily released, operational tempo is rising. The current world situation indicates that this problem will not soon diminish which exacerbates the problem even further. We must ask whether it is possible to accomplish these missions without adversely affecting our "go to war" capability. Furthermore, Active Component soldiers participating in contingency missions are often practicing skills which are not consistent with their combat requirements. By doing so, will they begin to loose their "warrior mentality" critically important to their ability to fight and win the nation's wars?

Diverting soldiers from their warfighting duties significantly reduces their national defense capabilities. The issue is that as America's Armed Forces, in particular the Regular Army, is diverted from its traditional military role; it becomes less combat oriented, and as a result less effective.<sup>39</sup> At some point, adversaries may surmise that they can move against us because our military preparedness has diminished significantly. If preparedness does diminish, our worldwide political and military influence could be greatly reduced.

Given the uncertainty of today's security environment, the American military must grow into a flexible, lethal, yet conscientious military capable of meeting increasing contingency operational requirements.<sup>40</sup> We must recognize that international security is becoming an

economic issue thereby requiring our full engagement in a multitude of roles with all available forces.

When we examine recent history, current domestic issues, pressing international problems and existing regional ethnic conflicts, it is evident that we are evolving to a new mentality of how we conduct military operations across all spectrums. A significant question like "what role should the Army Reserve or reserve forces in general play" can not be easily answered. In fact, part of our historical problem is that we have approached long term issues as though they were finitely answerable in the present. What we need is a single vision and a unified concept of how to employ that vision.

What we can do today is set in motion a plausible process for Reserve Forces participation in contingency operations. This process would identify a new agency responsible for coordinating these operations for the Reserves. Some of its responsibilities should include:

- (1.) Evaluate unit capabilities against future missions.
- (2.) Tailor force packages to meet given mission requirements.
- (3.) Objectively evaluate mission requirements to determine if Reserve Forces can effectively participate.
- (4.) Ensure the Reserve Components role is supportive of the geographic Commanderin-Chief's mission.
- (5.) Monitor Reserve Force involvement to determine if units are being successful while watching for signs that units must be removed.

If we can view Reserve participation as discussed above, questions concerning how and when they should be involved become more easily answered. A thorough, objective concept of

how Reserve Component Forces should be utilized will, by definition, ensure proper force mix.

In the end, deciding whether Reserve Forces should be utilized will be based on the unique facts involved. What is needed here is:

- (1.) Basic coordination, with intellectual agility to always seek the best forces available.
- (2.) Protection of unique capabilities.
- (3.) Clear, legal authority to mobilize units for all missions dependent on identified requirements.
- (4.) Creation of a new distinct agency with the authority and responsibility for implementing the plan.

### **CONCLUSION**

The Reserve Forces of today have grown into a national force capable of conducting a multitude of missions. Their history and the difficulties experienced with Desert Shield/Storm have been discussed only to demonstrate that their development has not come easily. The continual neglect by military and political leaders forced them into a period where their true value was easily questioned.

The successes of the past 10-15 years demonstrate their commitment and that of our National Command Authority to involve them in missions once considered sacred only to the Regular Army. They have continually demonstrated a willingness and ability to perform even under the most difficult times. Now that they have developed into a meaningful strategic force, the nation must continue to build upon their strengths utilizing their skills at every opportunity.

The Regular Army must continue to eliminate the cultural biases that suggest that Reserve soldiers can not perform critical missions. Current force structure restrictions mandate they be allowed to participate in a variety of missions to support the Regular Army and thereby somewhat alleviate the increased operational tempo. There is no doubt the Reserves can perform contingency operations on par with their Active Duty counterparts nor is there any doubt that the Active Component is vitally dependent upon their presence. All that remains is a true commitment to utilize the Reserves at every possible opportunity. The procedures and policies necessary to bring this about will most certainly follow.

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